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WATCHING THE WATCHERS:  





Punish him, yes. But please try to understand the defense’s point of view that there is 
a corporate responsibility. 
—Lawyer for Ivan “Chip” Frederick, court-martialed for his crimes at Abu Ghraib1 
We are fighting an indefinite war on terror.  In considering the policy and 
practice of this war, the history of the Japanese American internment looms 
large.  That history exists as moral parable as well as legal precedent.  In Deny-
ing Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial,2 I sought a careful remembering 
of the internment by holding the judiciary accountable for its actions.  That arti-
cle detailed how the Supreme Court in the 1940s, using techniques often praised 
as “minimalist,” avoided accountability on the part of the President and the 
Congress.  With a straight face, the Court held that the internment camps were 
never authorized by the political branches; rather, they were an ultra vires frolic 
committed by a civilian agency called the War Relocation Authority (WRA). 
Denying Prejudice also demonstrated how, in the 1980s, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals whitewashed history in the very act that granted extraordi-
nary relief to the brave wartime litigants who had challenged internment.  In 
granting the writ of error coram nobis and thereby overturning Gordon Hiraba-
yashi’s decades-old convictions, the Ninth Circuit simultaneously excused the 
wartime Supreme Court of any wrongdoing.  The official explanation inscribed 
into the federal reports was that the Court had been duped by unethical execu-
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tive branch lawyers.  Adopting this convenient story allowed another denial of 
accountability, this time on the part of the judiciary itself. 
Part II of this article briefly summarizes these arguments and describes how 
the judiciary dodged accountability in both the wartime and coram nobis cases.  
Part III shifts focus to today’s war and examines whether the judiciary is repeat-
ing this strategy of denial in the current “enemy combatant” cases.  In other 
words, is the judiciary exploiting similar interpretive and procedural tactics in 
order to feed the dogs of war while creating plausible deniability for those who 
unleashed them?  The net assessment is mixed, with good reasons for both op-
timism and alarm.  To be clear, the goal of this article is not to provide any sys-
tematic model for judicial review of military action against terrorist threats.3  In-
stead, its ambitions are more modest and focused: to help the judiciary invoke 




A. The Wartime Cases 
The wartime Supreme Court decided four cases on the Japanese American 
internment—Hirabayashi,4 Yasui,5 Korematsu,6 and Endo.7  In these cases, the 
Court deployed an arsenal of procedural, interpretive, and avoidance tech-
niques to achieve the following goals: 
(i) to not interfere with the internment which, although distasteful, made common 
sense and entailed what might be called “acceptable losses”; yet, (ii) to withhold ex-
plicit approval of the indefinite detention of concededly loyal U.S. citizens, a practice 
too difficult to reconcile with official commitments to “equal justice under law”; and 
 
 3. Such models have been put forth elsewhere in the academic literature.  See, e.g., Tania Cruz, 
Civil Liberties Post-September 11: Judicial Scrutiny of National Security: Executive Restrictions of Civil 
Liberties When “Fears and Prejudices Are Aroused,” 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 129, 152-70 (2004) (advo-
cating a “two-tiered framework for reviewing national security civil liberty restrictions that would first 
determine whether a heightened level of judicial scrutiny is appropriate and then articulate the execu-
tive’s burden of evidentiary proof”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertari-
anism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2004) (arguing that, during times of war, the courts have exercised scrutiny 
that focuses on the institutional processes used to make the decisions at issue, rather than on the con-
tent of the underlying rights); Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, In-
stitutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004) (proposing an equity 
approach to judicial review); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited—Correcting the Injustice of Ex-
traordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National 
Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) (suggesting that “except 
when martial law is legitimately in force, the standard of judicial review of government restrictions of 
civil liberties is not altered or attenuated by government claims of ‘military necessity’ or ‘national secu-
rity’ as justifications for the restrictions”). 
 4. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 5. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
 6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 7. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
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(iii) simultaneously, to avoid tarnishing its own reputation or that of the other federal 
branches, either by what it said or did.  Put bluntly: Let the military do what it will, 
keep its own hands clean, and forge plausible deniability for others.8 
1. Curfew: Hirabayashi and Yasui 
The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.9  Soon thereaf-
ter, in February 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
9066, which granted the Western Defense Command broad powers to exclude 
people from designated military areas.10  Pursuant to this order, General John L. 
DeWitt issued a curfew in March 1942 that applied to all enemy aliens as well as 
to Japanese American citizens (called “non-aliens”).11  Later, the military issued 
a series of over 100 exclusion orders, which funneled Japanese Americans, 
neighborhood by neighborhood, first into temporary assembly centers, then to 
what were euphemistically called “relocation” camps.12  Public Law 503, passed 
by Congress, criminalized any disobedience.13 
To create a test case, Gordon Hirabayashi disobeyed the curfew and evacua-
tion orders.14  In district court, he was convicted of violating these military or-
ders, and was given concurrent sentences for each violation.  The case was ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified the relevant legal 
questions to the Supreme Court.  The Court took the unusual step of calling up 
the entire case to be decided as if on appeal.15 
The decision came down on June 21, 1943.  Eager to make the case as sim-
ple as possible, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone sua sponte latched onto the hap-
penstance of Hirabayashi’s concurrent sentences and segmented the two convic-
tions.  In a classic exercise of judicial minimalism,16 Justice Stone observed that 
 
 8. Kang, supra note 2, at 965. 
 9. For a more detailed account of the internment process, see id. at 937-42; see also id. at 937 n.8 
(listing historical sources). 
 10. The Order read: 
I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he 
may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such ac-
tion necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he 
or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be 
excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall 
be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Com-
mander may impose in his discretion. 
Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
 11. Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Apr. 2, 1942). 
 12. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 288 (“Beginning on March 24, 1942, a series of 108 Civil Exclusion Or-
ders were issued by General DeWitt pursuant to Public Proclamation Nos. 1 and 2.”).  In my analysis, I 
use terms such as “curfew,” “evacuation,” and “relocation” ironically, as terms of art necessary to un-
derstand the technicalities of the cases.  See Kang, supra note 2, at 941 n.37. 
 13. See Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Military Areas or Zones, Restrictions Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 
(1942) (criminalizing disobedience of regulations of movement and actions in military areas). 
 14. Historical details regarding Hirabayashi appear in PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 87-93 
(1993). 
 15. For more procedural details of the case, see Kang, supra note 2, at 944. 
16.  Throughout this article, I make reference to “minimalism,” “minimalist virtues,” and “judicial 
minimalism.”  These terms refer to a theory of judging initially advanced by Alexander Bickel, then 
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affirming one conviction would make discussion of the other unnecessary.17  Not 
surprisingly, he focused on the easier question of curfew rather than the more 
troubling topic of evacuation. 
Having narrowed the issue, the Court proudly pronounced that 
“[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality.”18  But the curfew that applied to Hirabayashi, even though he was a 
United States citizen, was not enacted solely because of his ancestry.  Instead, 
the military had “ample ground” to be worried that ethnically-affiliated 
"sleeper cells"19 would aid a Japanese invasion.20  According to the Court, this 
was plain racial common sense.21  As a result, mere curfew—a relatively minor 
inconvenience during military crisis—was deemed a reasonable burden for 
Japanese Americans to bear. 
Yasui presented the identical curfew issue and was affirmed on the same 
grounds, on the same day.22  In the end, with many tens of thousands of Japa-
nese Americans behind barbed wire in prison camps, with no threat of invasion 
on the West Coast,23 the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court thought it appro-
priate to address only the matter of curfew, and held that curfew was all right by 
them. 
 
elaborated upon by Cass Sunstein.  Roughly speaking, a minimalist judge explains only that which is 
absolutely necessary to justify an outcome and strives to leave as many matters undecided as possible.  
Such a theory of judging could make aggressive use of legal doctrines that permit avoidance of specific 
issues or even entire cases.  For a more detailed discussion of “minimalist virtues,” and why they cannot 
justify the Supreme Court’s analysis in the wartime cases, see Kang, supra note 2, at 965-75.  
 17. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) (“Since the sentences of three months each 
imposed by the district court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary 
to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if we find that the conviction on the second 
count, for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained.”). 
 18. Id. at 100. 
19.  “Sleeper cell” is the current term for small groups of traitors and saboteurs in our midst; during 
World War II, the relevant term was “Fifth Column,” which was introduced during the Spanish Civil 
War to represent an invisible fifth column of troops supporting Franco within the city of Madrid.  See 
Irons, supra note 14, at 21. 
 20. 320 U.S. at 94-96. 
 21. Id. at 101 (“We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of 
war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy  may be a greater source of danger than 
those of a different ancestry.”). 
 22. See Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116-17 (1943). 
 23. The Battle of Midway, considered the decisive battle of the war in the Pacific, took place in 
June 1942 and shifted the offensive momentum in the war from the Japanese to the Americans and 
their allies. 
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2. Exclusion: Korematsu 
Eighteen months later, on December 18, 1944,24 the Court decided the next 
case: Korematsu.  Would the legality of the massive detention of Japanese 
Americans now be addressed?  The answer was again no, because the Court re-
deployed the segmentation technique.  Even though the exclusion order was in-
tegrally connected to Korematsu’s subsequent relocation into an internment 
camp, the Court refused to see it that way.  In a hyper-formalistic analysis, the 
Court insisted that evacuation and relocation were two separate orders, and 
that technically Korematsu had been convicted only for refusing to evacuate.25  
Ignoring the government’s own concession to the contrary,26 the Court specu-
lated that, had Korematsu obeyed the evacuation order, he might not have 
ended up in a relocation camp after all.27  Then, cloaking itself in the mantle of 
self-restraint, the Court explained that it should only address evacuation: “To 
do more would be to go beyond the issues raised, and to decide momentous 
questions not contained within the framework of the pleadings or the evidence 
in this case.”28 
Through segmentation, the sole question presented was whether the gov-
ernment could require Japanese Americans to evacuate their homes temporar-
ily, for personal safety and national security.  Framed this way, Korematsu was 
burdened little more than someone evacuated from a natural disaster.  In an-
swering this narrow question, the Court again “talked the talk” of equality 
without “walking the walk.”  Creating the foundation for what would, according 
to the conventional wisdom, become the rule of strict scrutiny, the Court trum-
peted: 
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect.  That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to 
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity 
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.29 
In application, however, the flowery words wilted into limp acceptance of time-
tested racial stereotypes.  It turned out that “pressing public necessity” included 
 
 24. Although Korematsu had originally been certified to the Supreme Court by the Ninth Circuit 
along with Hirabayashi and Yasui, there was a question whether an odd sentencing posture precluded 
an appealable final judgment.  A few weeks before deciding the curfew cases, the Court ruled that there 
was a final order and remanded the case, instead of addressing the merits as it could have and did in the 
curfew cases.  See Kang, supra note 2, at 949-50 (providing procedural history). 
 25. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221 (1944). 
 26. See Brief for the United States at 28-29, Korematsu (No. 22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
197, 230-31 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (“[H]ad [Korematsu] obeyed all of the 
provisions of the order and the accompanying Instructions, [he] would have found himself for a period 
of time, the length of which was not then ascertainable, in a place of detention.”). 
 27. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221. 
 28. Id. at 222. 
 29. Id. at 216.  For a brief trace of the doctrinal evolution of strict scrutiny, see NEIL GOTANDA, 
THE STORY OF KOREMATSU: THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CASES, IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 
Ch. 8 (Michael Dorff ed., 2004). 
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assumptions of disloyalty that would today be called racial profiling.  The ma-
jority could not see these crude generalizations as “racial antagonism.”30 
The payoff of the segmentation technique executed in Hirabayashi was sub-
stantial.  Reneging on its promise not to use Hirabayashi as precedent for the 
next case,31 the Korematsu Court wrote: “In the light of the principles we an-
nounced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond 
the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese an-
cestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.”32  Through segmenta-
tion, the Court could frame the evacuation question as a minor extension on a 
case already deemed constitutionally copacetic.  Indeed the precedent was so 
squarely on point that the Court, through double-negative circumlocutions, pro-
tested that it could not hold otherwise.  As summarized in Denying Prejudice: 
This segmentation technique allowed the Court to obscure its own agency and thereby 
minimize responsibility for its choice.  It ceded responsibility to a Supreme Court of 
the past (admittedly only one year past), which had established guidance squarely on 
point (even though the earlier Court had disclaimed that it was doing so).  Morally dis-
turbing, but technically exquisite.33 
3. Relocation: Endo 
The fourth and final case, Endo, was released on the same day as Kore-
matsu.  The question cleanly presented was whether the government could in-
definitely detain a concededly loyal American citizen.  Contrary to the first 
three cases, in this final contest, the Japanese American litigant won—but not 
on the grounds one might have thought.  There was no holding that the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government had deprived Mitsuye Endo, an 
American citizen, of her constitutional rights; rather, the Court decided the case 
on administrative law grounds.  It held fantastically that the WRA, which main-
tained the camps, was never authorized to detain Endo in the first place.34 
The Court began by examining Executive Order 9066 (delegating power to 
military to bar access to military areas), Executive Order 9012 (creating the 
WRA), and Public Law 503 (creating criminal penalties for violating duly issued 
military regulations).35  Reading literally, the Court saw no mention of “deten-
tion” in any of these documents.36  The Court further invoked the minimalist 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance: Steer clear of statutory readings that raise 
constitutional questions.  Accordingly, the Court presumed that the political 
 
 30. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219. 
 31. See id., at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The Court is now saying that in Hirabayashi we did 
decide the very things we there said we were not deciding.”). 
 32. Id. at 217–18 (emphasis added). 
 33. Kang, supra note 2, at 955. 
 34. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302-04 (1944). 
 35. Id. at 285-90. 
 36. Id. at 300–01.  The Court made an explicit finding that “[n]either the Act nor the orders use the 
language of detention.”  Id. at 300. 
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branches were “sensitive to and respectful of the liberties of the citizen.”37  In-
deed, the Court assumed that “lawmakers intended to place no greater restraint 
on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they 
used.”38  To read the relevant documents otherwise 
would be to assume that the Congress and the President intended that this discrimina-
tory action should be taken against these people wholly on account of their ancestry 
even though the government conceded their loyalty to this country. We cannot make 
such an assumption. As the President has said of these loyal citizens: “Americans of 
Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown that they can, and 
want to, accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own 
valuable contribution to the national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very 
ideals for which we are fighting this war it is important to us to maintain a high stan-
dard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all 
other minorities.”39 
In dissent, Justice Roberts sharply criticized the majority for “ignor[ing] 
patent facts”40 and for “hiding [its] head in the sand.”41  The Court’s blindness 
cannot be attributed to faithful adherence to some consistent interpretive 
methodology.  Contrast how the Court addressed similar authorization ques-
tions in Hirabayashi.  There, the Court saw authorization for curfew as applied 
to citizens, even though Executive Order 9066 and Public Law 503 made no 
mention of such authority and delegated power in the vaguest of terms.42  In 
other words, when convenient to see political authorization, the Court had X-
ray vision; when embarrassing, the Court saw no evil. 
Endo was thus a Pyrrhic victory, in that her freedom was granted through an 
exculpation of President Roosevelt and Congress.43  Also, Endo technically re-
leased no one else: The day before the opinion’s release—a Sunday of all 
days—the War Department somehow knew to rescind its curfew, evacuation, 
and exclusion orders unilaterally.44 
B. The Coram Nobis Cases 
The Japanese American redress movement of the 1980s was stunningly suc-
cessful.  The Executive branch apologized for its role in the internment.45  Con-
 
 37. See id. at 303–04.  Earlier in the opinion, the Court stated that, “[w]e have likewise favored that 
interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutional-
ity. . . .  We must assume that the Chief Executive and members of Congress, as well as the courts, are 
sensitive to and respectful of the liberties of the citizen.”  Id. at 299-300. 
 38. Id. at 300. 
 39. Id. at 303-04 (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 309 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89-90 (1943). 
 43. One might ask why the Court in Korematsu bothered to segment off evacuation from reloca-
tion, when the latter would be addressed in Endo, released the same day.  My answer appears infra Part 
III.B.1.b. 
 44. See Kang, supra note 2, at 964 (suggesting that Justice Frankfurter likely notified the War De-
partment prior to the decision, allowing it to rescind its orders the day before). 
 45. Proclamation No. 4417, “An American Promise,” 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976). 
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gress paid reparations.46  And the courts vacated the convictions of Korematsu, 
Yasui, and Hirabayashi in the extraordinary coram nobis cases.47  These rever-
sals were based on “smoking gun” evidence,48 unearthed at the national ar-
chives, which demonstrated the lack of military necessity for the internment.  
At first glance, the story of redress warrants unqualified celebration—but first 
impressions can be deceiving. 
Functionally, the writ of error coram nobis is cousin to the writ of habeas 
corpus, which was irrelevant because no petitioner remained in custody.  The 
coram nobis writ clearly required a showing of extraordinary circumstances 
amounting to a complete miscarriage of justice.49  What was uncertain was 
whether the writ also required actual prejudice—a showing that the wartime 
Court would have ruled otherwise but for the suppression of evidence. 
Korematsu was the first coram nobis case to be heard, in 1984.  The govern-
ment filed a nonresponsive two-page letter that encouraged the court to vacate 
the conviction without granting the writ, and simply to “put behind us the con-
troversy.”50  District Court Judge Marilyn Patel declined this invitation and in-
stead granted Korematsu’s petition.51  For her, the gross miscarriage of justice 
was obvious.  As for the prejudice issue, Judge Patel concluded that it was not 
necessary as a matter of law: “Whether a fuller, more accurate record would 
have prompted a different decision cannot be determined.  Nor need it be de-
termined.  Where relevant evidence has been withheld, it is ample justifica-
tion . . . that the conviction should be set aside.”52  This was true victory. 
By contrast, in Yasui, the next coram nobis case that was decided, District 
Court Judge Robert Belloni complied with the government’s request.53  With 
the now familiar rhetoric of self-restraint, he simply vacated Yasui’s criminal 
conviction without granting the writ.  Minoru Yasui died before his appeal 
could be heard. 
 
 46. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-383 (Aug. 10, 1988), 102 Stat. 903 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989d (2000)). 
 47. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Yasui v. United 
States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 
(N.D. Cal. 1984). 
 48. That evidence—including DeWitt’s original Final Report; exculpatory memoranda from the 
FCC, FBI, and the Office of Naval Intelligence; and the bowdlerized footnote in the government’s brief 
in Korematsu—is summarized in Kang, supra note 2, at 976-79.  Reproductions of the suppressed evi-
dence can be found in ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL L. IZUMI, JERRY KANG & 
FRANK H. WU, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT 300-09 (2001). 
 49. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1954) (stating that coram nobis “included 
errors of the most fundamental character,” such that “[o]therwise a wrong may stand uncorrected 
which the available remedy would right”). 
 50. Government’s Response and Motion, Korematsu (No. CR-27635W), reprinted in JUSTICE 
DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 210-12 (Peter Irons ed., 
1989). 
 51. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420. 
 52. Id. at 1419. 
 53. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 48, at 318. 
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The final coram nobis case was Hirabayashi’s, which the federal government 
litigated to the hilt, in sharp contrast to the prior cases.  After a full, weeks-long 
evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a split decision and vacated Hira-
bayashi’s conviction on evacuation, but not on curfew.  The different results 
turned on the question of prejudice.  The gross miscarriage of justice was clear, 
but, contrary to Judge Patel’s reading of the law, Judge Donald Voorhees held 
summarily that actual prejudice had to be shown.54  In his view, the suppressed 
evidence would have altered how the Supreme Court handled the evacuation,55 
but not the curfew,56 conviction. 
The appeal was heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by Judges Mary 
Schroeder, Alfred Goodwin, and Jerome Farris.57  On the question whether ac-
tual prejudice was legally required, the court—again invoking the “minimalist 
virtues”—declined to answer.  Why?  Because, regardless of whether prejudice 
was necessary as a matter of law, sufficient prejudice had been shown as a mat-
ter of fact.58  This finding meant affirming the trial court’s vacation of Hirabaya-
shi’s evacuation conviction.  It also meant reversing the trial court on the curfew 
conviction as clearly erroneous, because, according to the Ninth Circuit, the Su-
preme Court would have reversed that conviction too. 
By conventional wisdom, this amounted to total vindication for Hirabayashi.  
But probe beneath the surface:  By finding prejudice as a matter of fact, the 
Ninth Circuit adopted the official story that the wartime Supreme Court was an 
innocent, misled by duplicitous lawyers.  The Court did nothing wrong; it was 
merely tricked.  In the 1940s Endo opinion, the Court avoided holding Roose-
velt and Congress accountable; in the 1980s Hirabayashi opinion, the Ninth Cir-
cuit completed the “circle of absolution,”59 and ensured that the wartime Court 
would also have nothing to account for.  But, this official story of “wartime 
Court as innocent babe” is revisionist.60  As damning as the “smoking gun” evi-
dence uncovered in the 1980s was, the Court would not have ruled otherwise on 
the question of evacuation, and certainly not on that of curfew.  To suggest oth-
erwise is to revise history in order to insulate the Court from corporate respon-
sibility. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit did not have to reach this result.61  Given the 
precedent of the time, the court could simply have said that prejudice was not 
necessary to the coram nobis writ, allowing Hirabayashi to win without any 
 
 54. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (citing United States 
v. Dellinger, 657 F.2d 140, 144 n.9 (7th Cir. 1981)), rev’d in part, 828 F.2d. 591 (9th Cir. 1987).  There 
was no mention of the contrary ruling in Korematsu’s coram nobis case, which had concluded that 
prejudice was not necessary. 
 55. See id. at 1457. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 58. Id. at 603-04. 
 59. Kang, supra note 2, at 986. 
 60. See id. at 985-95 (explaining why this conception of the wartime Court is revisionist). 
 61. For a discussion of other paths the Ninth Circuit could have taken in the case, see id. at 995-97. 
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comment on, much less bleaching of, history.  This is, in fact, current coram no-
bis law in the Ninth Circuit, post-Hirabayashi.62  Still other options, none of 
which required accepting historical falsehoods, were available.63 
* * * 
The full argument is much longer and nuanced.64  Still, this sketch conveys 
the basic reasons why the wartime Court should be held to account for more 
than simply bowing to the pressure of military exigency.  It also explains why 
the coram nobis “victory” should be viewed ambivalently, for the courts artfully 
dodged corporate responsibility.  How the judiciary can manipulate legal con-
structs to deny political and moral responsibility is a central but unappreciated 




Civil libertarians and progressives have generally applauded how the “en-
emy combatant cases”65 have been decided.66  In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme 
 
 62. Under current Ninth Circuit coram nobis law, actual prejudice is not a legal requirement.  See 
id. at 996. 
 63. In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit could have held that actual prejudice was necessary, but 
since the Supreme Court would have affirmed Hirabayashi’s convictions even with the suppressed evi-
dence, no relief could be granted.  This would have produced a loss for Hirabayashi but nevertheless 
vindicated truth.  If this medicine was too bitter to swallow, still another possibility would have allowed 
speaking truth about history while ultimately vacating Hirabayashi’s convictions—to establish a rule of 
law that “[a]ctual prejudice is normally required to issue the writ of coram nobis; however, in cases of 
extraordinary manifest injustice, the writ will nonetheless issue.”  The full argument appears in the ap-
pendix to id. at 1006-13. 
 64. If the reader has objections or seeks additional points of clarification, I hope that Kang, supra 
note 2, addresses them. 
 65. In this study, the term “enemy combatant cases” refers to three cases decided by the Supreme 
Court in 2004: Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).  In addition, because the Court decided Padilla on jurisdic-
tional grounds, I include in my analysis the substantive portion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
opinion in that case. 
 66. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Do-
mestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1639-42 (2004) (Padilla as “an emphatic reaffirma-
tion of the importance of the rule of law”); Timothy Lynch, Power and Liberty in Wartime, 2004 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 23, 24 (“Fortunately, in a triumph for liberty, the Supreme Court decisively rejected the 
president’s reading of the law.”); David Cole, Comment, No Blank Check, THE NATION, July 19, 2004, 
at 4 (“The broader significance of the rulings lies in their ringing rejection of the argument that to de-
feat terrorism, the executive must have unfettered discretion.”); David Ignatius, Editorial, The Balance 
of Justice Amid a War, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at A15 (“The world went wobbly after Sept. 11. . . . 
Thanks to wise judges,  the United States and the world may finally be returning to solid ground.”); An-
thony Lewis, Editorial, The Court v. Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A27 (“It was as profound a 
day in the court as any in a long time. The justices did what they have often shied away from doing: said 
no to the argument that the title commander-in-chief means that the president can do whatever he says 
is necessary to win a war.”); Jonathan Turley, Commentary, A Near Miss For Key Rights, L.A. TIMES, 
June 29, 2004, at B13 (“The outcome Monday may be the ultimate testament to founding father James 
Madison, who said he wanted to design a system that would work even if it were run by less than an-
gelic beings.”).  But see Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantánamo Cases, 
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49, 68 (“The Guantánamo cases may be seen as a reaction, indeed an overre-
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Court held that federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus 
challenges of enemy combatants detained in Guantánamo Bay.67  In Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, the Court held that an American citizen, even one caught on foreign 
soil during combat, deserves rudimentary procedures to determine the legality 
of his detention.68  Finally, in Padilla v. Rumsfeld , the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the highest court to have spoken on the substance of Padilla’s facts, 
held that the President lacked unilateral power to detain indefinitely a United 
States citizen caught on American soil.69  Do the internment cases cast any dif-
ferent light on this upbeat assessment? 
A. Repetition? 
1. Segmentation 
Recall how the Supreme Court in the 1940s exploited the “segmentation” 
technique to avoid obstructing the military70 and also to obscure the Court’s 
own agency.71  One could sketch a similar strategy in the enemy combatant con-
text.  For example, the Court could have found a way to stagger deciding the 
cases from easiest to hardest, from Rasul (aliens, on foreign soil), to Hamdi 
(citizen, caught on foreign soil), and finally to Padilla (citizen, caught on 
American soil).  Each case could have been ex ante distinguished from the 
other, but the affirmance of the prior case could have been ex post used as guid-
 
action, to the broad claims the administration put forth in the name of executive power. . . . [T]he ad-
ministration missed an opportunity to distinguish between types of detainees and put forth a more 
modest argument. . . . [T]he federal courts are now going to interject themselves into many different 
aspects of the detention process.”). 
 67. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699; see also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 
(D.D.C. 2005) (holding that the procedures to determine whether Guantanamo Bay detainees are “en-
emy combatants” violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. 
Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D.D.C.2004) (holding that military commissions cannot try Guantanamo detainees 
for war crimes). 
 68. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his 
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a 
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”). 
 69. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003).  This case was reversed by the Supreme 
Court for lack of jurisdiction.  Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2727 (“We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and remand the case for entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice”).  Given 
this reversal, the opinion carries no precedential weight; however, it still provides the reasoning of the 
highest court to have addressed the merits and thus warrants inclusion in my analysis.  Padilla refiled 
his habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, which was recently 
granted.  See Padilla v. Hanft, 2005 WL 465691 (Feb. 28, 2005) (concluding that detention was not 
authorized by Congress and that the President lacked unilateral power to detain Padilla).   
 70. Recently, Eugene Kontorovich has made the same point about what I call segmentation.  See 
Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 755, 786-87 n.99 (2004) (referring to the general tactic of delay and avoidance in national secu-
rity contexts as “Vallandigham-Hirabayashi abstention”). 
 71. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist concedes “certain disingenuousness” in the sequencing of the 
cases, which produced differing results for the litigants Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo, when there 
was no reason to think that they had differing loyalties to the United States.  See WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 202 (1998). 
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ing precedent for affirming the next case—precisely the ploy executed in Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu. 
Elements of a segmentation strategy can be found in the enemy combatant 
cases.  For example, each case distinguishes itself from the others.  In Hamdi, 
for instance, the Supreme Court accepted for purposes of that case a definition 
of “enemy combatants” that clearly excluded Padilla.72  Conversely, in Padilla, 
the Second Circuit carefully distinguished the facts of Hamdi.73  In addition, the 
decisions reflect choices (if not manipulation) in timing.  Although all three 
opinions were issued on the same day, the Supreme Court delayed addressing 
the merits of Padilla, the Administration’s most difficult case, by deciding the 
case on jurisdictional grounds.74  Even if this was entirely correct judging, this 
result is reminiscent of the timing manipulation in Korematsu.75 
However, mere elements do not make the strategy.  The critical difference is 
that Hirabayashi lost, whereas Hamdi more or less won.  In the wartime cases, 
Hirabayashi’s loss on curfew provided legal momentum for Korematsu on 
evacuation.  By contrast, in the enemy combatant cases, Hamdi’s partial vic-
tory76 short circuits any similar incrementalist strategy.  If the Court had af-
firmed the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and analysis, then the specter of a gradualist 
extension to the facts of Padilla would have loomed.77  Happily, that is not the 
case. 
 
 72. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (“It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this case, the ‘en-
emy combatant’ that it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was ‘part of or supporting 
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed 
conflict against the United States’ there. . . .  We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: 
whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized.”) (citation omitted). 
 73. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 721 n.29  (“As we have previously noted, Judge Wilkinson, one of the 
authors of Hamdi III, remarked in his later concurrence to the decision not to rehear Hamdi III en 
banc that ‘[t]o compare this battlefield capture to the domestic arrest in Padilla v. Rumsfeld is to com-
pare apples and oranges’“) (citation omitted).  As explained above, the Padilla case is making its way 
back up through the federal courts a second time.  See supra note 69.  The District Court for South 
Carolina also sharply distinguished Hamdi from Padilla.  See Padilla, 2005 WL 465691, at *6.  
 74. On this point, the Justices sparred over the proper interpretation of Endo. In Endo, there was 
some question of whether Endo had properly exhausted her administrative remedies (by not complet-
ing the forms required by the WRA leave procedures) and whether jurisdiction remained since she had 
been moved to another camp.  The government did not pursue the former argument at the High Court 
in the Endo litigation; accordingly, the Supreme Court addressed the latter argument and concluded 
that subsequent movement of the petitioner did not destroy jurisdiction.  See Kang, supra note 2, at 959, 
n.142.  The Padilla majority interpreted Endo for a narrow exception to the “immediate physical custo-
dian” rule.  See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2721 (holding that a district court with jurisdiction over a habeas 
petitioner does not lose jurisdiction simply because the petitioner is no longer within its territorial ju-
risdiction). In dissent, Justice Stevens read Endo for “a more functional approach that focuses on the 
person with the power to produce the body.”  Id. at 2733 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 75. For more details on the manipulations in Korematsu, see Kang, supra note 2, at 949-50, nn.91, 
93. 
 76. To be sure, what counts as a “win” or a “loss” is complicated.  But no one doubts that the Su-
preme Court’s opinion afforded Hamdi more rights than recognized by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and expressly denied the Executive Branch a “blank check.” 
 77. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1002-03 (raising this fear of segmentation before the Supreme Court 
decided the enemy combatant cases). 
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This assessment confirms the truism that legal techniques such as segmenta-
tion generally lack intrinsic political valence.  What matters instead is how these 
techniques are utilized, with what self-knowledge, and toward what ends.  In 
sum, the judiciary is not using segmentation in the enemy combatant cases to 
allow some gradual erosion of civil liberties that avoids recognition of judicial 
agency or political accountability.  So far, there are reasons to be optimistic: 
The glass looks half-full.78 
2. Authorization 
In Endo, the Supreme Court manipulated the question of executive and 
congressional authorization to deny accountability.  By finding that the full-
blown internment had never been authorized by the President and Congress, 
the suffering of Japanese Americans was never attributed to the actors in fact 
responsible.  Congressional authorization also lies at the heart of the enemy 
combatant cases.  And in them, historical references to the internment abound, 
including prominent citation to Endo.  Is the judiciary again being willfully 
blind to authorization in order to avoid accountability? 
Answering this question requires first identifying the instances in the enemy 
combatant cases in which “no authorization” was found.  In Hamdi, that is prin-
cipally Justice Souter’s opinion, with passing agreement in Justice Scalia’s opin-
 
 78. To be careful, or perhaps paranoid, I should flag one potential segmentation strategy left open.  
Justice O’Connor made it clear that the term “enemy combatant” was poorly defined, and accepted for 
purposes of this litigation that it was “an individual who . . . was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to 
the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against 
the United States’ there.”  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004).  Further, on the critical 
question of whether Hamdi enjoyed a right to counsel, Justice O’Connor declined to answer.  See id. at 
2652 (“He unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on re-
mand.  No further consideration of this issue is necessary at this stage of the case.”).  On this point, 
some commentators have mistakenly read in greater constitutional protections than what the Court 
granted.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 1641 (“[T]he Justices were explicit that Hamdi must 
be given a meaningful factual hearing [which a]t a minimum . . . includes . . . the right to be represented 
by an attorney”). 
In subsequent cases, pursuant to a segmentation strategy, the following could be decided: 
• the definition of “enemy combatant” can be expanded slightly to include the likes of 
Padilla (by not requiring foreign capture); 
• the Court decides that although notice and opportunity to rebut claims according to some 
reasonable standard of proof are required, detainees have no right to counsel; 
• if the Authorization of Military Force (AUMF), discussed further infra, authorized 
Hamdi’s detention, it must have authorized Padilla’s detention, which was consistent with the 
post-9/11 fear of domestic terrorism. 
Is it possible that Hamdi’s partial victory sets up a Padilla loss in which both branches of government 
are seen as authorizing the detention of a U.S. citizen, on American soil, as long as he is granted primi-
tive process—but without benefit of counsel? 
Perhaps this is too much of a stretch.  Specifically, on the last point of authorization, five Justices 
seem to suggest that the AUMF does not authorize Padilla’s detention.  Three Justices joined Justice 
Stevens in his dissent in Padilla, in which he wrote that there was no authorization.  See Padilla, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2735 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Breyer, who found authority as to Hamdi’s 
detention, Souter, and Ginsburg).  However, the body text associated with that footnote was equivocal, 
pointing out that “reasonable jurists may answer in different ways.”  Id. at 2735.  In addition to these 
four, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Hamdi, made clear that there was no authorization even as to 
Hamdi.  Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ion.  In Padilla, that is the Second Circuit majority opinion.  Since Padilla has 
been reversed and remanded on jurisdictional grounds,79 the analysis here fo-
cuses on Justice Souter’s opinion. 
Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter began his analysis with the Non-
Detention Act (NDA), which states: “No citizen shall be imprisoned or other-
wise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”80  
He provided the relevant context of the NDA’s passage.  In 1971, Congress re-
pealed the Emergency Detention Act (EDA) of 1950, a Cold War statute, to 
lessen the chances of another Japanese American internment.81  But because the 
EDA provided some procedural protections, legislators worried that repeal 
would leave citizens in some ways even worse off.  Accordingly, Congress en-
acted the NDA to complement the EDA’s repeal and to require clear congres-
sional authorization before detention of any United States citizen.82  Moreover, 
as Justice Souter pointed out, the NDA was passed “in light of an interpretive 
regime that subjected enactments limiting liberty in wartime to the requirement 
of a clear statement . . . [as] unmistakably expressed in Ex parte Endo.”83 
Applying this clear statement standard, Justice Souter could not find au-
thorization to detain Hamdi in the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) enacted by Congress after September 11.84  As he pointed out, there 
was no mention of detention.  Moreover, numerous other governmental tools 
could be used against the likes of Hamdi.  And, by negative implication, the 
passage of the Patriot Act, which limits detention of alien terrorists to seven 
days, militated against statutory interpretations that would grant weaker protec-
tions to alleged citizen terrorists.85 
This opinion resembles Endo in that both find “no authorization” to detain, 
but the similarity is only superficial.  As detailed in the Appendix, finding “no 
authorization” does not always undermine accountability.  In Endo, the finding 
of no authorization was made essentially after the fact—after the burden had 
 
 79. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct.  2711 (2004). 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004). 
 81. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment) (pointing out legislative history mentioning the concentration camps). 
 82. Referring to explicit legislative history on point, Justice Souter also rejected the government’s 
argument that the NDA did not apply to military detentions.  Id. at 2655-56. 
 83. Id. at 2655. 
 84. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 85. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, took a very different line of argument in his Hamdi 
dissent, but agreed for similar reasons that the AUMF did not authorize Hamdi’s detention: 
Contrary to the plurality’s view, I do not think this statute even authorizes detention of a citi-
zen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the interpretive canon that statutes should be con-
strued so as to avoid grave constitutional concerns; with the clarity necessary to comport with 
cases such as Ex parte Endo and Duncan v. Kahanamoku; or with the clarity necessary to 
overcome the statutory prescription that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise de-
tained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  Finally, in Padilla, which addressed 
the slightly different facts of an American citizen captured on American soil, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals similarly found no statutory authorization for the detention.  Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 
695, 718-24 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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been inflicted, the dirty deed done, and the only matter remaining was to assign 
responsibility.  By finding no authorization, the Supreme Court placed all blame 
on a little-known agency instead of on the actual political actors responsible.  
Justice Roberts, concurring only in Endo’s result, described the tactic and its 
consequence: 
I think it inadmissible to suggest that some inferior public servant exceeded the au-
thority granted by executive order in this case. Such a basis of decision will render 
easy the evasion of law and the violation of constitutional rights, for when conduct is 
called in question the obvious response will be that, however much the superior execu-
tive officials knew, understood, and approved the conduct of their subordinates, those 
subordinates in fact lacked a definite mandate so to act. It is to hide one’s head in the 
sand to assert that the detention of [Endo] resulted from an excess of authority by 
subordinate officials.86 
Justice Souter’s opinion does precisely the opposite.  His conclusion is more 
injunctive than rhetorical, in the sense that it is not after the fact, but in the 
thick of action, and it would specifically command the military to stop continu-
ing detention.  Further, by requiring Congress to speak explicitly if it wants to 
empower the military to detain Hamdi, Justice Souter’s opinion encourages po-
litical accountability. 
Consistent with this interpretation is Justice Souter’s attitude toward the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine.  In Endo, to justify its ludicrous statutory in-
terpretation, the Court waxed eloquent about this doctrine.  Consider, by con-
trast, what Justice Souter wrote on the constitutional question of whether the 
President could unilaterally authorize Hamdi’s detention: “I need to go no fur-
ther; the Government hints of a constitutional challenge to the statute, but it 
presents none here.”87  Nonetheless, he continued: “I will, however, stray across 
the line between statutory and constitutional territory just far enough to note 
the weakness of the Government’s mixed claim of inherent, extrastatutory au-
thority under a combination of Article II of the Constitution and the usages of 
war.”88  This willingness to engage in dictum—in order to send clear signals to 
the political branches about constitutional right and wrong—does not reflect 
the rhetorical style and complicit tone heard in the wartime cases.89 
Hamdi provides still more evidence that the same doctrinal technique (for 
example, finding no authorization) can be used for varying ends (for example, 
to undermine or to promote accountability).  It also provides additional cause 
for optimism: Perhaps the glass is three-quarters full.  Any optimism must, of 
 
 86. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 309 (1944) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 87. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2659 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Similarly, in the Second Circuit’s Padilla opinion, the majority expressly refused to invoke the 
canon of “constitutional avoidance.”  The government had encouraged reading the NDA to apply only 
to civilian, not military, detentions in order to avoid the constitutional question of the limits of Article 
II power.  But the court rejected the invitation and explained that “the doctrine of constitutional avoid-
ance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.”  Padilla, 352 F.3d at 721 (citations omit-
ted).  But students of Endo know that ambiguity can be found when convenient. 
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course, be tempered by the fact that Justice Souter did not command a plurality, 
much less a majority.90 
B. Rehabilitation? 
The manner by which the enemy combatant cases invoke, apply, and distin-
guish the internment precedents (almost always ignoring the coram nobis cases) 
makes possible their rehabilitation.  Precedents once disdained or forgotten 
could be repositioned rhetorically and legally in a more favorable light, through 
citation practices and subtle omissions.  How are the internment cases being re-
habilitated? 
1. Misremembering Endo 
a. Naive readings.  Prompted by the briefs and perhaps by Pat 
Gudridge’s recent article,91 judges are now remembering Endo. Unfortunately, 
there have been some flat-out wrong recollections.  For instance, in analyzing 
whether the NDA applies to military detentions, the Second Circuit wrote in 
Padilla: 
Because the World War II detentions were authorized pursuant to the President’s war 
making powers as well as by a congressional declaration of war and by additional con-
gressional acts, see Endo, 323 U.S. at 285-90, the manifest congressional concern about 
these detentions also suggests that section 4001(a) limits military as well as civilian de-
tentions.92 
According to Endo, however, the World War II detentions were not authorized 
by the President and Congress.  To be sure, curfew was authorized.  So was 
evacuation, and maybe even temporary detention until loyalty could be deter-
mined.  But according to the Endo Court, the internment camps writ large—
notwithstanding annual funding by Congress—were never approved by the po-
litical branches.  At least, that is the official line.93 
More worrisome is the naïve manner in which Endo is cited for the proposi-
tion that citizen detention must be clearly authorized.  For instance, in the 
Hamdi opinion, Justice Souter repeatedly cites Endo at face value for the 
propositions that Congress never authorized the internment camps during 
World War II94 and that a clear statement for citizen detention is necessary.95 
 
 90. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, which was joined by three other members of the Court, 
found authorization for Hamdi’s detention.  Justice Thomas, in his dissent, agreed on this authorization 
point.  That means a total of five Justices found authorization.  Further analysis of these “yes authoriza-
tion” opinions, and their meaning in terms of accountability, is provided in the Appendix. 
 91. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003). 
 92. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 720. 
 93. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (“For we conclude that, whatever power the War 
Relocation Authority may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens 
who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure.”). 
 94. Justice Souter offered no qualification of the Court’s findings in Endo: 
 [T]he internments of the 1940’s were accomplished by Executive action.  Although an Act of 
Congress ratified and confirmed an Executive order authorizing the military to exclude indi-
viduals from defined areas and to accommodate those it might remove, see Ex parte Endo, 323 
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The Second Circuit’s Padilla opinion displays an even more naïve reading.  
In Padilla, the court rejected the government’s argument that congressional ap-
propriations for detention camps constituted authorization.  The court’s author-
ity was Endo, which held that expenditures cannot be interpreted as ratification 
unless there is precise earmarking of funds for the specific challenged action.96  
But that claim when it appeared back in Endo was preposterous.  Although 
Congress for years funded the internment camps, the Endo Court remained 
willfully blind to ratification.97  The Court manufactured a hyper-specificity re-
quirement—what Justice Roberts called “an element never before thought es-
sential to congressional ratification”—solely to shield Congress from responsi-
bility.  It is this hyper-specificity requirement that the Second Circuit Padilla 
majority relies on.98 
Here, then, is cause for dissonance.  How can opinions that promote ac-
countability cite to Endo, which was deviously designed to deny accountability?  
Perhaps experiencing dissonance is itself naïve since, as this article has already 
observed, legal doctrines generally lack a single political valence.99  To use Jus-
tice Jackson’s now clichéd “loaded gun” metaphor, a gun used against civil lib-
erties (in Endo) can be picked up six decades later and used in favor of civil lib-
erties (in the enemy combatants “no authorization” opinions).  To reverse 
another tired saying, one can use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s 
house. 
 
U. S. 283, 285-288 (1944), the statute said nothing whatever about the detention of those who 
might be removed, id., at 300-301; internment camps were creatures of the Executive, and con-
finement in them rested on assertion of Executive authority, see id., at 287-293.  
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judg-
ment). 
 95. Id. at 2656 n.2.  Justice Thomas also reads Endo at face value.  See id. at 2677-78 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 96. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724.  The court quoted directly from Endo: 
[The appropriations statute] authorizes nothing beyond the expenditure of money.  Endo un-
questionably teaches that an authorization of funds devoid of language “clearly” and “unmis-
takably” authorizing the detention of American citizens seized here is insufficient. See 323 
U.S. at 303 n.24 (acknowledging that Congress may ratify past actions of the Executive 
through appropriations acts but refusing to find in the appropriations acts at issue an intent to 
allow the Executive to detain a citizen indefinitely because the appropriation did not allocate 
funds “earmarked” for that type of detention). 
Id. 
 97. Endo, 323 U.S. at 304 n.24.  The Court implausibly insisted: 
[T]he appropriation must plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority which is 
claimed. We can hardly deduce such a purpose here where a lump appropriation was made for 
the overall program of the Authority and no sums were earmarked for the single phase of the 
total program which is here involved. Congress may support the effort to take care of these 
evacuees without ratifying every phase of the program. 
Id. 
98.  In ruling on the refiled habeas petition, the District Court for South Carolina made the same 
naïve read of Endo.  See Padilla v. Hanft, 2005 WL 465691 at *10 (Feb. 28, 2005) (quoting Endo’s lan-
guage that “We must assume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive 
authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and 
unmistakably indicated by the language they used.”). 
 99. See supra Parts III.A.1 and 2. 
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Still, truth is at stake here, and the truth of Endo must not be denied.100  Jus-
tice Souter’s citation to Endo for the proposition that Congress did not author-
ize the internment camps reinscribes a falsehood.  And, in some ways, it is more 
dangerous when that reinscription occurs in an opinion that promotes account-
ability, which invites celebration, not skepticism.  After a few more repeti-
tions,101 who will remember anything but the official line?102  Who will remember 
the truth of Endo? 
b. Remember Endo?  But the truth of Endo is contested.  Specifically, 
Pat Gudridge remembers Endo much more favorably, as an essential counter-
point to Korematsu, which was decided on the same day.  His thesis is compli-
cated and argued in rich, evocative prose.  But boiled down, the essential ele-
ments of his claim are: (i) Korematsu is not as important as believed—because 
Endo was decided the same day;103 (ii) Endo is better than remembered—it was 
a “constitutional” decision that freed the Japanese; (iii) the two cases act as mu-
tually repelling counterpoints that must be equally weighted.  Because of its in-
fluence,104 Gudridge’s thesis warrants detailed engagement. 
 
 100. I made a similar point about the value of truth in my critique of the coram nobis cases in Deny-
ing Prejudice.  See Kang, supra note 2, at 997-1004. 
 101. Numerous amicus briefs filed in the enemy combatant cases offered naïve readings of Endo.  
See, e.g., Brief of the ACLU et al. at 16-17, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696); 
Brief for Professors of Constitutional Law et al. at 15-16 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) 
(No. 03-1027); Brief for Original Congressional Sponsors of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(A) at 22, Padilla (No. 03-
1027); Brief for the Center for National Security Studies and the Constitution Project at 9, Padilla (No. 
03-1027). 
 102. Consider, for example, the comments of Judge Shira Scheindlin, who writes: “For example, the 
Court decided Hirabayashi in the thick of World War II. Just one year later—but after American forces 
landed on Normandy beach and in the Philippines, and the Japanese threat had all but subsided—the 
Court essentially reversed itself in Endo.”  Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due 
Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 839-40 (2004).   
There was no “reversal” in Endo except in the most formal sense.  For other liberal triumphalist 
readings of Endo in the amicus briefs, see, e.g., Brief of the American Bar Association at 6-7, Hamdi 
(No. 03-6696) (suggesting that the judiciary vindicated its “essential obligation to provide American 
citizens with meaningful review of executive detentions” in Endo); Brief of Washington Legal Founda-
tion et al. at 15, Padilla (No. 03-1027) (citing Endo as authority that the Japanese Americans had been 
“detained based solely on racial consideration”); see also Alan M. Dershowitz, WHY TERRORISM 
WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 162 (2002) (“There is, 
however, an important difference between the detention of Japanese-American citizens and torture.  
The detentions were done openly and with presidential accountability; torture would be done secretly, 
with official deniability.”) (emphasis added). 
 103. To avoid misunderstanding, let me be clear that Gudridge posits Korematsu as an “infernal 
baseline,” Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1934, and assures us that remembering Endo will not make us 
forget the wrong of internment.  Id. at 1939. 
 104. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3, at 21-23 (adopting Gudridge’s analysis wholesale).  
The authors analyze Endo even more triumphantly than Gudridge: 
Evacuation and restrictions on mobility reflected military judgment (faulty or pernicious as 
they may have been) of what was necessary for security. Detention, however, reflected politi-
cal and policy judgments, not military ones.  Despite the emphasis Korematsu has had at the 
expense of Endo, the fact is that even during this bleak episode, the Court continued to resist 
executive branch actions that, at most, rested on political and policy, rather than military, 
judgments. 
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Gudridge’s appreciation of Endo stems largely from the fact that it freed the 
Japanese.105  However, this result deserves less weight than he gives it: the even-
tual freedom of loyal Japanese Americans after Roosevelt was re-elected and 
after military exigency had passed was never in question.  Indeed, by late 1944, 
the WRA was more concerned about how it would get internees out of the 
camps than how it could keep them in.  At greater issue was how the Court 
would make an accounting in 1944 for what the government had done.  Indeed, 
since release was inevitable, the best thing that Endo could do for the Japanese 
Americans was to provide a reckoning of who did what to whom—to pro-
nounce that (i) democratically elected leaders had authorized their imprison-
ment and that (ii) this imprisonment violated their constitutional rights.  Endo 
did neither. 
First, by finding no authorization, the Court attributed the internment 
camps to the lowly WRA.  On this there is no dispute.  Second, although 
Gudridge makes creative arguments on why Endo should be viewed as a consti-
tutional case,106 the Court’s plain language makes clear that Japanese Ameri-
cans’ constitutional rights were not actually vindicated: “We are of the view that 
Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty.  In reaching that conclusion we do 
not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have been argued.”107 
 
Id. at 21; see also Patrick Baude, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After 
September 11?: An Essay on the Spirit of Liberty in the Fog of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1321, 
1331 (2004) (remarking on how the author thought about Korematsu “before I read Patrick Gudridge’s 
recent study of the Endo case”). 
 105. This is not technically true since the military unilaterally rescinded its orders the day before 
Endo was handed down.  Gudridge notes this fact.  Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1935.  That said, the 
reason the military acted on the specific day it did was to beat the judicial opinion to the punch.  See 
also Issacharoff  & Pildes, supra note 3, at 21 (“Korematsu as an actual legal decision turns out to have 
had no practical effect . . . . By the time the Court was deciding Korematsu . . . the practical question 
was whether continued detention was permissible. And on that, Endo was decisive . . . . The initial 
evacuation had long ago taken place; the Court could not undo that or its consequences. All the Court 
could do, as a practical matter, was order the end to continued detention. And that is what it did.”). 
 106. Examining the drafting history of Justice Douglas’ opinion, Gudridge notes the deletion of lan-
guage that more clearly demonstrates a strategy of constitutional avoidance.  Gudridge, supra note 91, 
at 1956.  Relying on this sort of excavation, especially when the plain meaning of the opinion’s text is 
accessible, is a questionable interpretive methodology; I am uncertain that we want the meanings of 
Supreme Court opinions to change as we find, in the future, red-line annotations in version-controlled 
word processing documents.  Further, to the extent that this is an attempt to discern authorial intent, 
Douglas’ own spoken words are telling and are explicitly to the contrary.  As acknowledged by 
Gudridge, Douglas makes plain that he could not forge a majority to decide the case on constitutional 
grounds; therefore, he wrote the opinion the only way he could, on statutory grounds.  Id. at 1953. 
In making his case that Endo was a constitutional decision, Gudridge further contends that the 
structure of Douglas’ opinion does not reflect the typical organization of constitutional avoidance ar-
guments.  The conventional organization, he suggests, is to lay out the various preconstitutional inter-
pretive possibilities, then in order to avoid some constitutional question or concern, the Court self-
consciously exercises discretion to adopt a second-best choice.  Even if such a cookie-cutter template 
were uniformly used, there is another explanation why the Court did not list potential alternatives: the 
only other alternative was to suggest that President Roosevelt and Congress had authorized Endo’s de-
tention.  To then publicly proclaim an exercise of judicial discretion, instead of invoking the rhetoric of 
(false) necessity, would have undermined the objective of shielding the political branches of responsi-
bility.  Denying corporate responsibility is not done most effectively by alerting your audience that that 
is what you are doing. 
 107. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (emphasis added). 
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One final argument should be dispositive.  Under Gudridge’s favorable 
reading of Endo, what explains Korematsu’s tortured and implausible segmen-
tation of evacuation from detention?  Why go through such machinations, ig-
noring the government’s own concession,108 if on the very same day the Court 
would rule in Endo that indefinite detention was illegal?  Was it just to create a 
riddle to be solved in the law reviews six decades later? 
No, the segmentation was necessary in the Court’s dodge of corporate re-
sponsibility.  Recall that the Court held that Endo’s detention was never au-
thorized by the President or Congress.  The only way that the Court could reach 
this “no authorization” conclusion was to segment detention from evacuation, 
which was obviously authorized.  If the two orders were instead seen as facets of 
an organic whole, the Court could not have divined differential authorization in 
favor of evacuation but against detention.  Korematsu formally severed what 
was in reality unseverable—not to create a “Liang gate”109 but to open the trap 
door for Endo’s escape.110 
Rather than emancipation and vindication for Japanese Americans, Endo 
offered exculpation for the political branches.  Endo should not be seen as the 
nemesis of Korematsu, or as “zhengfanshu” (front and reversed writing).111  In 
less recondite terms, Korematsu and Endo fit “hand in glove,” reflecting a gen-
eral strategy of tolerating significant “collateral damage” to racial minorities 
(them), in order to protect the mainstream (us), and then covering up the un-
pleasantries.  Instead of immiscible constitutional swirls, the two cases reveal a 
consistent pattern of denying corporate responsibility. 
c. Ironic embrace.  Endo’s clear statement rule need not be abandoned 
as the fruit of some poisonous tree.  Korematsu’s current doctrinal status pro-
vides a useful analogy.  Law students are often perplexed how Korematsu can 
be disparaged like Plessy v. Ferguson,112 but still never be overruled.  The riddle 
is formally solved by distinguishing the legal rule from its application.  As a le-
gal rule, Korematsu remains good law, in the sense that it has never been re-
versed and also in the sense that “strict scrutiny” is arguably what should be ap-
plied to racially prejudiced classifications.  This explains how Korematsu can be 
 
 108. See Brief for the United States, supra note 26, at 28-29, Korematsu (No. 22). 
 109. Drawing on art historian Wu Hung’s work, Gudridge teases out a cryptic metaphor of the two 
cases as symbols on the pillars of a Chinese funeral gate.  Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1965-68. 
 110. I made the same argument in Denying Prejudice: 
If the evacuation and detention issues were fused together and considered in unison, the 
Court would have had a much more difficult time explaining how one facet of the indivisible 
program had been authorized by the executive branch and Congress while another facet was 
not. In contrast, by decoupling the two components, it became possible for the Court to see 
military authorization to evacuate, and not see War Relocation Authority authorization to de-
tain indefinitely. The ACLU attorneys that coordinated the wartime cases before the Supreme 
Court clearly held this view. 
Kang, supra note 2, at 965 n.172. 
 111. Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1966. 
 112. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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prominently cited as recently as 1995 in the Supreme Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence.113 
By contrast, Korematsu acts as “anti-precedent” in its application of the le-
gal rule to the facts.  The application failed not only because the Court was fed 
bad data, as demonstrated by the coram nobis cases, but also because the Court, 
influenced by its racial schemas,114 deferred to the racial common sense of the 
times.  This contextualized understanding separates the baby from the bath wa-
ter.  The “strict scrutiny” rule can be preserved while the rubber-stamping ap-
plication of the rule can be flushed. 
The same should be done with Endo.  Its “clear statement” legal rule (per-
fectly fine) should be distinguished from its historical application (deceitful).  
The legal rule, never having been overruled, remains good law.  But a naïve re-
habilitation of Endo means that its “clear statement” rule could be deployed 
across the board, perhaps to deny accountability the next time. 
To put a fine point on it, suppose that the military commits a spate of hor-
rific tortures, in the light of some ambiguous statute or Executive Order that 
permits highly coercive interrogation.  After the fact, a court could excuse the 
President and Congress of any wrongdoing and instead blame low-level soldiers 
by finding that no one ever authorized quite this kind of barbarism.  Using what 
authority?  See Endo, which is being revivified in the enemy combatant cases 
without due care.  Now, the glass appears only half-full. 
2. Resurrecting Hirabayashi 
Are the other wartime opinions also being resurrected?  Not Korematsu as 
applied.  For example, Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi opinion explicitly cites to Jus-
tice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu, which argued that there must be more rig-
orous judicial review.115  And to the credit of the Department of Justice, the only 
wartime case cited in its briefs in the enemy combatant cases was Endo.116 
 
 113. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, Es-
say, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court Moves from Approving Internment of Japa-
nese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for Asian Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 165, 
176-78 (1996). 
 114. For a more detailed discussion of racial schemas, see Kang, supra note 2, at 955-58.  See gener-
ally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1528 (elaborating a model of 
racial mechanics that draws on racial schemas infused with implicit bias). 
 115. “[I]t does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-
honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented 
here. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 233-234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (‘[L]ike 
other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must 
subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other 
interests reconciled’).”  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649-50 (2004). 
 116. The government cited Endo on matters of habeas jurisdiction, entirely appropriate in the 
Padilla discussion.  See Brief for Petitioners at 21 n.8, 26 n.12, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 
(2004) (No. 03-1027).  The government also contested Endo’s clear statement rule to the enemy com-
batant cases on the grounds that Endo addressed civilian agency detention, in contrast to detention by 
the military.  See Brief for Respondents, Hamdi (No. 03-6696), at 22 n.7; Petitioner’s Brief at 45-46, 
Padilla (No. 03-1027).  In Padilla, the government argued that here, the President had explicit authori-
zation to detain enemy combatants under 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), which “grants specific authorization for 
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Hirabayashi, however, is being reawakened.  In the Supreme Court’s opin-
ions, it makes only a cameo appearance: in Justice Thomas’s dissent in Hamdi, 
for the proposition that the judiciary should defer to the factual predicates of 
executive branch decisionmaking as virtually conclusive.117  But it is featured 
more prominently in the Second Circuit’s Padilla opinion.  The Second Circuit 
made clear that its conclusion turned on the fact that Congress had not author-
ized Padilla’s detention, and that therefore, within the familiar Youngstown 
framework,118 the President was acting at the nadir of his power.  However, the 
court added, “[t]o be sure, when Congress and the President act together in the 
conduct of war, ‘it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their ac-
tion or substitute its judgment for theirs.’  Hirabayashi v. United States.” 119  In 
other words, on the authority of Hirabayashi, Padilla’s detention would pose no 
constitutional problems if Congress simply said so.120 
Imagine what happens when the next shoe drops.  Suppose that Congress 
does speak explicitly, in the heat and fog of a major terrorist attack, and author-
izes massive race or ethnicity-based detention.  Even if Congress is not so ex-
plicit, imagine the courts’ finding authorization in some vaguer pronouncement 
in a repeat of the Hirabayashi strategy.  According to the Second Circuit and 
Justice Thomas, the judiciary has essentially no role to play.121  This deference 
abandons a critical check on governmental abuse, especially majoritarian tyr-
anny. 122 
 
the military to expend appropriated funds of the detention of persons ‘similar to prisoners of war,’“ as 
opposed to the Congressional “lump appropriation” for the WRA’s “overall program” which led to the 
ruling of no authorization in Endo.  See id. at 39 n.15 (No. 03-1027).  Also in Padilla, the government 
claimed that Endo’s clear statement rule did not apply, because (i) the Court is not being asked to find 
implied powers in a delegation of authority and (ii) the restraint imposed on Padilla (that is, detention) 
is not greater than that contemplated by the AUMF’s authorization of “all necessary and appropriate 
force.”  Id. at 42 n.17 (No. 03-1027). 
 117. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 118. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 119. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 713 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 120. Jason Weida points out that Hirabayashi was cited in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown frame-
work.  Jason Collins Weida, A Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1432 (2004). 
 121. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 1639 (pointing out that the Second Circuit did not answer to 
what extent the executive and legislative branches, acting in unison, can suspend the Bill of Rights for 
citizens deemed enemy combatants). 
 122. In this brief article, I cannot offer a more methodical defense of this plain statement.  However, 
since 9/11, there has been an explosion of scholarship analyzing the proper role of judicial review in 
times of terror that does discuss its merits as a check on governmental abuse.  Compare Bruce Acker-
man, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) (treating “extraconstitutional” action by 
the executive as inevitable and proposing a framework of political controls in times of crisis), and Mark 
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 304 
(2003) (exercise of power during emergencies should be extraconstitutional) with Laurence Tribe & 
Patrick Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004) (criticizing Ackerman’s 
framework as unworkable) and David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s 
Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753 (questioning Ackerman’s lack of faith in judicial review during times of 
crisis); see also Mark Tushnet, Response: Issues of Method in Analyzing the Policy Response to Emer-
gencies, 56 STAN. L REV. 1581 (2004) (deferential judicial review during times of crises reflects rebal-
anced cost/benefit analysis); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 605 (2003) (arguing that judicial deference in times of crisis does not lead to “ratcheting down” 
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How is it possible that Hirabayashi can be so casually cited when cases like 
Korematsu (as applied) are placed in the same abyss as Dred Scott and Plessy?  
It is partly because, although Korematsu is valenced negatively in our constitu-
tional culture, Hirabayashi is largely unknown.  Its positive citation in the en-
emy combatant cases increases the chances that Hirabayashi will slip into main-
stream constitutional discourse without due diligence.123  Before that happens, 
here is a reminder of Hirabayashi’s meaning: 
• It was about segmentation, which sliced and diced issues to make room 
for a delayed Korematsu. 
• It was about finding authorization in ambiguous text to excuse the po-
litical branches from saying distasteful things explicitly.124 
• It was about rejecting any notion that citizens should have to bear the 
burdens of war in common.125 
• Finally, Hirabayashi was about the Supreme Court cruelly accepting an 
impossible Catch-22 for racial minorities.  In the case, the Supreme 
Court embraced the logic that, because the United States had mis-
treated the Japanese, it was rational to assume that they would be more 
disloyal, which in turn made them a greater security threat.  With heart-
less precision, it stated: 
There is support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which have 
prevailed since the close of the last century, when the Japanese began to come to this 
country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in large 
measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population.126 
 
civil liberties and decisionmaking based on “irrational fear”); Bernard Bell, Marbury v. Madison and 
the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (2003) (judicial review should push difficult ques-
tions to politically accountable branches); John Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429-30 (2003) (judicial review should be highly deferential, and “provide op-
tions” to executive branch in times of war). 
 123. Hirabayashi surfaced repeatedly in the amicus briefs filed with the Court, and was cited ap-
provingly by a number of the amici.  See, e.g., Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, U.S. Representa-
tives Joe Barton, Walter Jones, and Lamar Smith, and Allied Educational Foundation at 9, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law & 
Justice at 2, 5, 16-17, 23-24, 26, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027); and Brief for 
Senators John Cornyn and Larry E. Craig at 17, Padilla (No. 03-1027). 
 124. There is a long history of such chicanery as applied to Asian Americans.  See, e.g., Keith Aoki, 
No Right to Own: The Twentieth-Century Alien Land Laws as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 
37, 55-71 (1998) (discussing the Supreme Court’s upholding of Western states’ alien land laws, which 
targeted Japanese immigrants using the term “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” in order to escape the 
“federal judicial or legislative ire” that an explicitly racial bar would attract). 
 125. Six years later, Justice Jackson would make the general argument with characteristic elo-
quence: “The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more 
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”  Railway 
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949). 
Drawing on the same common sense insight, Gordon Hirabayashi had argued that curfew should 
apply to all citizens alike or to none at all.  But, the Court explained that such burdening of other 
Americans was irrational and unnecessary, and that the Constitution did “not compel so hard a choice.”  
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943). 
 126. Id. at 96.  The footnote to this quotation listed in encyclopedic detail all the de jure and de facto 
discriminations to which the Japanese had been subject.  Moreover, as the Japanese American Citizen’s 
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Hirabayashi’s creep back into respectability should be stopped.  At the level 
of social norms, Hirabayashi should be stigmatized so that attorneys, especially 
government attorneys, pause before citing it as support for its argument.127  
Judges and their law clerks, before cutting and pasting language from briefs into 
opinions, should likewise linger and question its authority, as conceived in the 
broadest sense. 
Preventing Hirabayashi’s casual rehabilitation would have been easier if the 
coram nobis cases had been decided differently.  If truth had been spoken to 
power, each citation to the Hirabayashi of the 1940s would have to be followed 
by a “but see” signal to the Hirabayashi coram nobis case of the 1980s with a 
searing parenthetical.  That parenthetical would explain that the Supreme 
Court, even if it had been given all the suppressed evidence, would have none-
theless affirmed Hirabayashi’s convictions.  If this were our official history, Hir-
abayashi would be more difficult to rehabilitate.  But this never happened, and 
Hirabayashi emerges from our collective ignorance.  The glass is half-empty. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps I am an alarmist.  Only an academic would pick through the techni-
cal details of the internment, coram nobis, and enemy combatant cases to iden-
tify minutiae about segmentation, authorization, actual prejudice, and citation 
practices to cobble together some accountability bogeyman.  Instead, the big 
picture reveals only good news: Korematsu bad (racist);128 Endo good (Japanese 
 
League (JACL) argued in its amicus brief: “By [this line of reasoning], the Nazi treatment of the Jews is 
vindicated, for the Jews of Germany had suffered civil and social disabilities and therefore, by the sadis-
tic turn of logic, should have been ripe for treason to the Reich precisely as Herr Hitler declared.”  
Brief of the JACL at 64-65, Hirabayashi (No. 870). 
In his own brief, Yasui added: “[I]n days to come the Government may argue that the Japanese-
Americans have not been assimilated into American life because during World War II they were 
locked up in concentration camps.”  Brief for Appellant at 34, Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 
(1943) (No. 871). 
 127. Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional 
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) (pointing out the anti-Asian racist underpinnings of 
the plenary power cases). 
 128. For example, Eric Muller notes that eight of nine current sitting Supreme Court Justices “have 
either written or concurred in opinions describing Korematsu as an error.”  See Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 
9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 571, 586 (2002). As evidence, Mul-
ler points to statements in Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990), Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc., v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  (Justice Souter is 
not listed, but Muller properly attributes that simply to a lack of occasion.  See Muller, supra, at 586 
n.75.)  On the one hand, Muller is correct that, besides the Chief Justice, the current sitting Justices 
have not provided apologia for the results in Korematsu.  On the other hand, we should be cautious 
about reading too much into the cases that Muller cites. 
In two of the cases, the statements by the more conservative Justices discrediting Korematsu are de-
ployed to change constitutional doctrine to strike down affirmative action programs.  In Metro Broad-
casting, Justice Kennedy dissents (with Justice Scalia joining) from the majority’s decision not to apply 
“strict scrutiny” to federal affirmative action in broadcast license distribution.  He points out that 
“[e]ven strict scrutiny may not have sufficed to invalidate early race-based laws of most doubtful valid-
ity, as we learned in Korematsu.” 497 U.S. at 633.  In Adarand, the dissent’s view in Metro Broadcasting 
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Americans win); coram nobis opinions good (convictions vacated); and enemy 
combatants cases good (courts have jurisdiction and some legal process re-
quired).  In caricature, the objection goes, “Don’t Worry, Be Happy.”129  Stated 
more aggressively, the objection suggests that clear victories are being need-
lessly undermined as only partial, perhaps Pyrrhic.  Let the people enjoy Endo.  
Let them enjoy the coram nobis opinions.  Who cares about non-ironic em-
braces of precedent, whatever that might mean?  Who cares about citations to 
Hirabayashi in Padilla when the petitioner wins?  No one else sees a problem; 
why stir up trouble and look for one?  The glass, the objection insists, is half-
full. 
But my concerns are not invented.  The techniques of segmentation and se-
lectively discerning authorization can be exploited in today’s war to deny ac-
countability.  An inaccurate remembering of the internment cases also risks 
noncontextual resurrections of Endo and Hirabayashi—again, with real-world 
consequences. 
More fundamentally, truth matters.  What happened in the internment was 
the governmental acceptance and propagation of a racist lie—that persons of 
Japanese descent in America were traitors because of their race.  The truth was 
otherwise, and that truth has surfaced over time.  Only a passionate commit-
ment to the truth has driven courageous efforts, such as the coram nobis litiga-
tion, to further expose the truth.  My analysis of the 1940s and 1980s cases is 
that truth has been revealed only partially, and the judiciary—supposedly the 
most principled branch of government—has dodged a truthful accounting. 
Even at the level of symbolism, this argument matters.  For many Ameri-
cans—some of whom are unaware of even the internment itself—a technical 
academic inquiry may have no impact.  But the target audience is lawyers and 
law-informed policymakers who are guiding the war on terror.  For them, I am 
contesting the broad-brushed symbolism that is taught in highly stylized and re-
 
becomes the majority, and Justice O’Connor writes (with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Ken-
nedy, Scalia, and Thomas joining) that, “Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even ‘the most rigid scru-
tiny’ can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification. . . . Any retreat from the most 
searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring in the future.”  515 
U.S. at 236.  Many would not take great solace in conservative Justices saying bad things about Kore-
matsu in order to strike down most race-based affirmative-action programs.  See, e.g., YAMAMOTO ET 
AL., supra note 48, at 22; Gabriel J. Chin, Sumi Cho, Jerry Kang & Frank Wu, Beyond Self-Interest: 
Asian Pacific Americans Toward A Community Of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 
UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 142 (1996).  
The third case that Muller cites, Stenberg, addressed the constitutionality of a ban on partial-birth 
abortion procedures.  Justice Scalia, in dissent, compared the majority’s striking down of the ban as 
akin to Korematsu and Dred Scott.  See 530 U.S. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Harsh words indeed, 
which should make Justice Scalia’s subsequent embrace of Korematsu difficult.  But these words were 
not written in a national security context, and no doubt the next time, the facts of military exigency will 
be distinguishable from World War II.  Recall that the legal rule now understood to have been set by 
Korematsu remains good law: As recently articulated in Grutter v. Bollinger, “the lesson of Korematsu 
is that national security constitutes a ‘pressing public necessity.’“  123 S. Ct. 2325, 2351 (2003). 
 129. For a decidedly more pessimistic view about what has happened post 9/11, see, e.g., Karen 
Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173 (2004) 
(focusing on loss of immigrants’ rights). 
12_KANG_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:40 AM 
280 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:255 
dacted form in typical constitutional law classes.  The internment cases are of-
ten taught as embodying the traditional liberal vision of the rule of law working 
itself pure by correcting errors made by a few bad apples—as Endo corrected 
Korematsu, as the coram nobis opinions corrected the wartime cases, and so on.  
I offer a more critical counter-story that hones in on the judiciary, which, under 
the law’s magnificent cloak, has covered its institutional derrière through deft 
legal exegesis.  That counter-symbol—not of law working itself pure, but of 
judges dodging corporate responsibility—is what we must remember during 
these tortured times. 
Many commentators suggest that we have learned our lessons from World 
War II, and something as grotesque as the internment will never happen 
again.130  In some ways, this must be true, since the civil rights battles of each 
generation look different from the ones of the past.  Still, those who confidently 
assert that we have learned our lessons must answer two questions. 
First, precisely what lessons did we learn?131  In Denying Prejudice, for ex-
ample, I demonstrated that no one had noticed the dark underbelly of the co-
ram nobis opinions, which had been previously only celebrated.  In the current 
article, I have argued that we have misremembered Endo.132 
Second, why do we assume that we learn but never forget?  It is only 
through constant vigilance that the internment can remain a lighthouse that 
helps us navigate the rocky shores triangulated by freedom, equality, and secu-
rity.  We can never presume “never again.”  And as judges watch over, case-by-
case, how our rights survive in a climate of anger and fear, I hope they receive 
guidance from the internment, as precedent and parable, without naïveté.  Let 
us watch them. 
V 
APPENDIX: AUTHORIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. The Authorization/Accountability Matrix 
Recall the central complaint about Endo: Its finding of “no authorization” 
was used to deny accountability by passing off responsibility to the WRA, de-
scribed as a rogue agency.  Should “no authorization” thus be equated with 
“undermine accountability”?  Not necessarily: remember Hirabayashi.  Neither 
 
 130. See, e.g., David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review in Times of Crisis, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2575 (2003) (“In short, Korematsu has not proved to be the ‘loaded weapon’ that 
Justice Jackson feared. To the contrary, it has served as an object lesson in what the Court and the gov-
ernment ought not do in future crises.”); Gudridge, supra note 91; Scheindlin & Schwartz, supra note 
102. 
 131. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 122, at 290 (“Although General DeWitt’s reasons for action may 
have rested on racist assumptions, the decisions of the higher-ups, relying on DeWitt, were not.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 3, at 416 (“Cases like the Steel Seizure Case and Ex parte Endo 
reflect a pragmatic judiciary that understands exigency but does not lose sight of the values of equality 
and integrity that assertions of exigency can obscure.”).  My read of Endo is that equality was sacrificed 
in order to maintain the appearance of integrity. 
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Executive Order 9066 nor Public Law 503 spoke explicitly of curfews, certainly 
as applied to American citizens.  Nevertheless, in that case, the Supreme Court 
found authorization in the ambiguous text, thereby excusing the political 
branches from explicitly authorizing such burdens, even as to American citi-
zens, solely on the basis of ancestry.133  This meant that the political branches got 
what they desired without having to spell out, in distasteful detail, racial dis-
crimination in the U.S. Code.134 
To untangle the relationship between authorization and accountability, con-






NO AUTHORIZATION Quadrant I Quadrant III 
YES AUTHORIZATION Quadrant II Quadrant IV 
 
Quadrant I is the Endo case (internment camps were not authorized, so neither 
Roosevelt nor Congress could be held accountable).  Quadrant II is Hirabaya-
shi (race-based curfew was authorized even as applied to citizens, so neither the 
Executive nor Congress required a more explicit green light).  Depending on 
the context, either finding on the question of authorization can undermine ac-
countability. 
There is also a second column, which suggests that an interpretation about 
authorization can sometimes promote accountability.  On the one hand (Quad-
rant III), finding no authorization could stop military action in its tracks and 
force Congress to muster up the courage and political capital to do explicitly 
what it was attempting to do implicitly.  This could be called the anti-
Hirabayashi case—what would have happened in an alternate universe if upon 
challenge, curfews as applied to citizens were struck down as unauthorized.135 
On the other hand (Quadrant IV), just the opposite may be true: Finding 
authorization could promote accountability.  This is the alternate universe’s 
anti-Endo case.  If the Supreme Court in Endo had held that the internment 
camps were authorized by F.D.R. and Congress, then it would have had to ad-
dress Endo’s constitutional claims.  The political branches of government could 
not have dodged constitutional censure.136 
 
 133. See Kang, supra note 2, at 963. 
 134. This is not to say that if such specificity were required the political branches would not have 
complied with subsequent clarifications, but it was even simpler not to have to.  And this could create 
more plausible deniability later, as in Endo. 
 135. Cf. Bell, supra note 122, at 218 (characterizing clear statement rules as vindicating constitu-
tional rights). 
 136. On this general point about the complexity of interpreting legislative will, Margulies notes the 
conflict of interpretive norms, which encourage deference on foreign affairs and national security mat-
ters but require respect of constitutional rights.  See Margulies, supra note 3, at 404-05.  I agree with the 
genuine difficulty of the interpretive enterprise in such contexts, but my emphasis is that, in the face of 
such ambiguity and complexity, the court has and may again flex the doctrines to deny accountability. 
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B. Categorizing the Opinions 
This matrix helps distinguish between opinions that undermine versus pro-
mote accountability.  Consider, first, the “no authorization” opinions.  These 
are Justice Souter’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions in Hamdi, as well as the Sec-






 NO AUTHORIZATION I. Endo III. anti-Hirabayashi 
YES AUTHORIZATION II. Hirabayashi IV. anti-Endo 
 
Looking across the first row of the matrix, the question becomes whether these 
opinions replicate the Endo (Quadrant I) gambit, which would be troubling, or 
represent the anti-Hirabayashi strategy (Quadrant III), which would be heart-
ening.  Above, I explained why they fall into Quadrant III.138 
However, Justice Souter’s opinion did not command a majority in Hamdi.  
In fact, a total of five Justices found “yes authorization.”  Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion139 provided the reasoning.  Specifically, she found that Con-
gress, in enacting the Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) after 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, authorized the detention of Hamdi as a nec-
essary incident to war.  It made no difference that Hamdi was a citizen.140  Jus-
tice Thomas, although approaching the case quite differently, nonetheless 






NO AUTHORIZATION I. Endo III. anti-Hirabayashi 
 YES AUTHORIZATION II. Hirabayashi IV. anti-Endo 
 
How should we classify Justice O’Connor’s “yes authorization” opinion?  
Applying the matrix, the two possibilities appear in the second row: Quadrants 
II or IV.  The Quadrant II (Hirabayashi) strategy undermines accountability by 
stretching to find authorization under ambiguous circumstances.  By contrast, 
Quadrant IV (anti-Endo) promotes accountability by attributing responsibility 
 
 137. Judges Pooler and B.D. Parker were in the majority.  Judge Wesley concurred in part and dis-
sented in part.  Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 138. See supra Appendix, Part A. 
 139. Justice O’Connor was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy 
and Breyer.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (“We do not reach the question whether 
Article II provides such authority, however, because we agree with the Government’s alternative posi-
tion, that Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.”). 
 140. This was not an authorization of “perpetual detention”; the fact that effective operations 
against the Taliban were ongoing in Afghanistan meant that detention for the time being was congres-
sionally authorized.  Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641-42. 
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for lawless141 action to the responsible political actors.  Its primary effect is to 
speak truth to power, to force an accounting.  This is what would have hap-
pened if the Endo Court had not laid all blame on the WRA. 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion does not fit neatly into either Quadrant.  
Viewed favorably, the opinion shows some features of Quadrant IV.  The re-
quirement of more constitutional process partly rebukes the conditions of 
Hamdi’s detention.  Moreover, her opinion puts Congress on notice that it has 
authorized Hamdi’s detention, and if it disapproves, it should act accordingly.  
Viewed less charitably, however, the opinion features various qualities of 
Quadrant II.  Justice Souter argues persuasively that the AUMF is ambiguous 
in authorizing Hamdi’s detention.  Yet, by finding authorization at least as long 
as “active operations” are ongoing in Afghanistan, the Court permits detention 
to continue, without Congress having to authorize expressly such citizen deten-
tion.142  Of course, some due process strings are attached—to allow for “a mean-
ingful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neu-
tral decisionmaker.”143 
The fairest assessment of Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi plurality is to recognize 
that it straddles the two quadrants.  On the one hand, it does not clearly pro-
mote accountability, which could have been achieved better by a contrary find-
ing on authorization.144  On the other hand, it does not clearly deny accountabil-
ity either, since additional constitutional procedures are mandated regardless of 
the authorization. 
 
 141. “Lawless” is a slight exaggeration; it is possible that morally despicable action is both affirma-
tively authorized by the political branches and not negatively circumscribed by the Bill of Rights. 
 142. In addition, in terms of style, Justice O’Connor’s opinion does not outwardly reject the doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance.  She repeats that, because she finds authorization, she need not “reach the 
question whether Article II provides such authority [independently].” Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639.  See 
also id. (“Again, because we conclude that the Government’s second assertion [that AUMF authorized 
detention] is correct, we do not address the first [that the NDA does not apply to civilian detentions].”). 
 143. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635. 
 144. Requiring clear and unmistakable congressional authorization was the virtue of Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, which brought together the ideological odd couple of Scalia and Justice Stevens.  Justice Scalia 
argued that on these facts, Congress only had two constitutional options: prosecution for treason or 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  Congress should not shy and hide behind the shadows, and 
rather be forced to “pull the trigger” if it wants such detentions carried out. 
